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AbSTRAcT
A common criticism of international human rights declarations is that they 
lack an adequate account of the corresponding obligations. This criticism is 
often thought to be particularly apt when applied to economic and social 
rights. International human rights law imposes these obligations on states, 
but critics object that this treats the problem (state behavior) as the solu-
tion. This article examines the question of the obligations corresponding to 
economic and social rights in the context of debates about world poverty. 
It argues that the legal and philosophical emphasis on obligations must be 
supplemented by an understanding of both institutions and motivations if 
practical progress to eradicate world poverty is to be made. 
I. INTROdUcTION: THE PRObLEM Of ObLIGATIONS
The philosopher Onora O’Neill, in her BBC Reith Lectures of 2002, noted 
that the list of rights proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights is often seen as canonical. But, she went on to say, the Declaration 
says almost nothing about the corresponding duties. International human 
rights law proclaims universal rights, but fails to tell us who is obliged to do 
what for whom, and why. Declarations of rights, she maintained, assume a 
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passive view of human life and of citizenship. They proclaim our entitlements, 
but they do not tell us our obligations and thus do not guide our actions.1
O’Neill appears to have overlooked the preamble to the Declaration, 
which proclaims it to be:
a common standard for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every indi-
vidual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, 
shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and 
freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure 
their universal and effective recognition and observance.2 
The Declaration, far from assuming a passive view of human life and of 
citizenship, imposes a stringent, even unrealistically demanding, set of 
obligations on all individuals to strive to secure the effective observance of 
the Declaration rights. If it were objected that this is an excessively literal 
reading of a merely rhetorical text, we should recall that Eleanor Roosevelt, 
who chaired the Declaration’s drafting committee, insisted that the Declara-
tion precisely assumed obligations of active citizenship.3
International human rights law is fairly clear as to who should do what 
for whom. For example, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) states, in Article 2 (1), that each state party shall 
“[undertake] to take steps, individually and through international assistance 
and co-operation, . . . to the maximum of its available resources, with a 
view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized 
in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including the adoption of 
legislative measures.”4 The wording is, perhaps necessarily, somewhat vague, 
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allowing states to evade their obligations by sophistical, legal reasoning, but 
it is an exaggeration to say that it does not tell us who is obliged to do what 
for whom. Nevertheless, international human rights law imposes obligations 
on states not citizens, and thus does not seem to address O’Neill’s concern 
about the obligations of active citizens. 
O’Neill finds that the allocation by international human rights law of 
obligations to states is inadequate for three reasons: many states are unable 
to fulfill their human rights obligations; many states are unwilling to fulfill 
them; and millions of human beings are stateless.5 International human rights 
law is therefore “deluded” to assume that states can be entrusted with hu-
man rights obligations. It may be desirable to work towards an ideal world 
in which all states are both able and willing to fulfill their human rights 
obligations. Meanwhile, millions suffer from the violation of their human 
rights. If we take the universalism of obligations as seriously as we take the 
universalism of rights, we should look to non-state actors to make whatever 
contribution they can to the implementation of human rights.6 
Jack Donnelly defends the statist conception of human rights. The idea 
that human rights obligations are universal, he allows, is “inherently plau-
sible,” but it is not “the contemporary understanding.” That is, the duties that 
are correlative to human rights are assigned almost exclusively to states. This 
state-centric conception of human rights is not necessary, but it has deep 
historical roots and reflects the central role of the state in modern politics. 
The need for an active state is especially clear for the fulfillment of economic 
and social rights. The moral universality of human rights has been codified 
in a set of authoritative international norms, but in an international system in 
which government is national rather than global, these international norms 
must ultimately be realized through national action.7
The apparently different assessments of international human rights law 
by O’Neill and Donnelly arise in part from their different theoretical perspec-
tives. O’Neill approaches international human rights law from the perspec-
tive of neo-Kantian moral and political philosophy. She seeks to develop a 
rational conception of global justice with an appropriate set of rights and 
obligations. This project entails the identification of appropriate “agents of 
justice.”8 The statism of international human rights law, she believes, fails 
to allocate appropriate obligations to a plausible set of such agents. This is 
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particularly apparent when we are considering economic and social rights 
and the challenge of world poverty. 
Donnelly offers a theory of human rights, which he calls “the Universal 
Declaration Model,” recognizing the central role that the Declaration has 
played in establishing what he believes to be the contemporary consensus 
on human rights. Donnelly says that for the purposes of international action, 
“human rights” means what is in the Universal Declaration, and international 
human rights law provides authoritative standards for all states in the con-
temporary world.9 O’Neill finds international human rights law inadequate 
because it fails to identify agents of justice with appropriate obligations. 
Donnelly finds that international human rights law allocates authoritative 
obligations to states, which are the legitimate agents of justice. Donnelly 
explicates “the contemporary understanding” of human rights; O’Neill sub-
jects it to critical evaluation and finds it wanting. 
Donnelly admits that there are no significant international mechanisms 
for the enforcement of human rights obligations, and that, in many countries, 
national legal means of implementation are not very effective. Nevertheless 
he insists that states remain by far the most important actors in determin-
ing whether people enjoy their human rights: their formal endorsement of 
international human rights obligations is of immense importance.10 
The empirical evidence about the impact of international human rights 
law on the enjoyment of human rights is, however, both complex and in-
complete. Recent studies suggest that this impact is limited and dependent 
on several other variables. The ratification of human rights treaties by itself 
does nothing for human rights. The evidence suggests that ratification makes 
little or no difference to the human rights performance of established democ-
racies or authoritarian states; it makes more difference in new democracies. 
Ratification is likely to lead to improvements in respect for human rights 
if it is followed by civil society mobilization. This is most likely to occur 
when human rights are highly valued because they are not well respected, 
but when there is also sufficient freedom to mobilize: this may explain why 
ratification has most effect in semi-democracies. The statist model of hu-
man rights implementation also assumes that human rights violations are 
committed by states with more or less complete control over their societies 
and that they commit human rights violations intentionally. Some states are 
like this, but many developing countries have states with limited capacity to 
implement human rights. The statist model ignores human rights violations 
by non-state actors that states cannot control.11 
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The universality of human rights, Donnelly concedes, is a universality of 
possession (everyone has the same human rights) rather than a universality 
of enjoyment.12 O’Neill’s objection to human rights proclamations is not 
only that they fail to specify the obligations of citizens, but also that they 
fail to specify the institutions that would most properly and effectively bear 
the obligations to fulfill human rights. Proclamations of universal economic 
and social rights that fail to identify institutions with the relevant obligations 
“may seem bitter mockery to the poor and needy, for whom these rights 
matter most.”13 
II. AN INSTITUTIONAL APPROAcH
Thomas Pogge responds, implicitly, to O’Neill’s concerns by adopting an 
institutional approach to human rights within a theory of global justice.14 
He begins this response with a revised version of Rawls’s theory of justice. 
Rawls’s theory specifies that, provided that certain fundamental freedoms 
and the principle of equal opportunity are guaranteed, any advantages that 
accrue to the better-off members of a society are justified only if they improve 
the conditions of the worst-off.15 The theory accepts the existing system of 
nation-states. Pogge holds this to be a serious defect because, he believes, 
the nation-state is a crucial contributor to the current institutional produc-
tion of global poverty and inequality. He argues that the international legal 
regime is an instrument developed by governments to serve their special 
interests. It is not, therefore, the most suitable institutional framework for 
realizing human rights. Pogge argues that the current global institutional 
order is unjust in view of the extreme deprivations that it engenders and 
that acceptance of the states-based regime of human rights inhibits the quest 
for a more just world.16 
The global institutional order is the appropriate context for political phi-
losophy. The question is how we should assess the global institutional order 
from a moral point of view. Pogge’s Rawlsian answer is that we should first 
and foremost consider the consequences for its least advantaged participants. 
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However, he differs from Rawls in identifying the least advantaged as those 
who lack the protection of the rights set out in the Universal Declaration.17 
Thus, although he criticizes “the global institutional order,” he appeals to 
the principles of international human rights. 
Pogge answers O’Neill’s objection that the Universal Declaration ignores 
the institutions necessary to implement human rights by invoking Article 28 
of the Declaration, which states that everyone is entitled to an international 
order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in the Declaration can be 
fully realized. Under the current global institutional order many millions can-
not meet their most fundamental needs for food and physical security. This 
order is unjust if there is a feasible alternative order that would not engender 
similar deprivations.18 Article 25 of the Universal Declaration provides the 
basis for Rawlsian global justice by proclaiming that everyone has the right 
to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and 
his family, including food, clothing, housing, and medical care.19
Pogge cites estimates that, in the world today, 830 million human beings 
are undernourished; 1,100 million lack access to safe water; 2,600 million 
lack access to basic sanitation; 1,000 million lack adequate shelter; about 
2,000 million lack access to essential drugs; some 774 million adults are 
illiterate; and there are 218 million child laborers. According to the World 
Bank, as of 2004, 2,533 million or 39.7 percent of humankind were living in 
severe poverty. On average, the people living below this line fell 41 percent 
below it. About 950 million were living on less than half, that is, below the 
World Bank’s official extreme-poverty line. Each year some 18 million people 
die prematurely from poverty-related causes. This is one-third of all human 
deaths—50,000 each day, including 29,000 children under age five.20 These 
numbers are controversial, but there are no non-controversial numbers.21 
Pogge combines the Rawlsian idea that political justice should give 
priority to improving the conditions of those who are worst-off with the 
conception of human rights found in international human rights law. In so 
doing, he responds to O’Neill’s call to connect the idea of human rights with 
a theory of corresponding obligations and appropriate institutions. 
III. WHOSE RESPONSIbILITIES?
We have reason, Pogge argues, to view the existing global institutional order 
as unjust and to hold those collaborating in its perpetuation responsible for 
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the imposition of this order on its victims. This unjust institutional scheme 
is imposed by us. Therefore, we have the obligation to initiate institutional 
reforms for a global order that does not engender the severe poverty that 
exists in our current world. Those most disadvantaged by the global in-
stitutional order have virtually no means to initiate reforms. We do have 
such means. Our obligation to rectify the global injustice of severe poverty 
derives, therefore, from our collaboration with the imposition of an unjust 
global institutional order and our ability to initiate and support reforms of 
that order.22 
We have a moral obligation not simply to accept prevailing institu-
tions; we should examine them from a moral point of view. Where they are 
unjust, we should see how we might contribute to their reform and help 
to mitigate some of their harmful consequences. Where just institutions 
are lacking altogether, we should help to bring them about. A critique of 
institutions as unjust may imply that there are unjust actions by individu-
als, namely those who can create, perpetuate, and reform the institutions. 
However, the injustice of institutions is not reducible to the wrongful actions 
of individuals because it refers to the rules according to which individuals 
choose their actions. Slave-owners may act unjustly towards their slaves, 
but even the most beneficent slave-owners act within an unjust institution. 
Nevertheless, Pogge holds that the choice of ground rules is to some extent 
up to us collectively, and the consequences of this choice are “of the great-
est moral significance.”23 
According to Pogge, we are advantaged participants in the global order 
who help to maintain it, and are collectively capable of changing it. The 
responsibility for unjust institutions, and for reforming them, is not confined 
to those who control or benefit from them, but rests also with all participants 
in the social system, though perhaps in proportion to the benefits they enjoy 
under the unjust system and surely in proportion to the opportunities they 
have to support institutional reform. The more advantaged and more powerful 
participants in the prevailing global institutional scheme impose it on the 
rest and are collectively responsible for the injustice of the scheme insofar 
as they actively perpetuate it and resist its reform. Pogge appears to allocate 
the obligation to reform the global order according to the extent of causal 
responsibility for it, of benefit from it, and capacity to change it. This might 
suggest that the obligations rest with the political and economic elites of 
the richest and most powerful countries. However, Pogge is clear that all 
citizens of the developed nations are causally and morally responsible for the 
creation and perpetuation of the current unjust global institutional order.24
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Nevertheless, governments and statesmen bear a special responsibility 
for global injustice. Governments often fail to honor the values they pro-
claim because they lack the political will to make those values effective; 
this is a moral failure, primarily of politicians. Notwithstanding his critique 
of the state system as responsible for global injustice, Pogge considers that 
states should take the first steps towards a more just world, and that these 
steps would have to be, at least in the beginning, motivated by prudential 
considerations.25 
Although Pogge allocates the primary obligations to rectify global in-
justice to political elites, he also allocates obligations to reform the unjust 
global institutional order to “us,” the citizens of the developed nations. But 
sometimes he qualifies this by prioritizing the obligations of those who 
benefit most from the injustices of that order and those who have the great-
est capacity to initiate the necessary reforms. However this responsibility is 
allocated, its ground is our collective causal responsibility for the injustice 
of global institutions. Pogge argues that this causal responsibility gives rise 
to a moral responsibility for our collective role in imposing these institutions 
upon their most disadvantaged, involuntary participants. We have a negative 
duty not to collaborate in the imposition of unjust institutions and we have a 
positive obligation to promote institutional reform.26 Thus, Pogge’s pragmatic 
statism, which closes the gap somewhat between his philosophical theory 
of human rights obligations and Donnelly’s legal and political approach, is 
combined with an emphasis on the duties of citizens, as O’Neill required 
of an adequate theory of human rights.
Some hold that we have positive obligations to the global poor; oth-
ers deny this. Pogge does not reject the former view, but considers it less 
contentious that we have a negative obligation not to violate the human 
rights of distant foreigners than that we have a positive obligation to ensure 
that their human rights are fulfilled; negative duties to refrain from harming 
others are more stringent than positive duties to assist others.27 He holds 
that articles 25 and 28 of the Universal Declaration give to everyone the 
negative human right not to be subject to an unjust global order that violates 
their Article 25 right to an adequate standard of living, and that those who 
participate in imposing such an unjust global order on the poor violate that 
negative human right. The negative obligation not to collaborate in unjust 
practices may, however, require positive action. We have a collective moral 
obligation to reform the unjust global institutional order.28 
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Pogge does not infer from our collective responsibility for the injustice 
of the global institutional order that we are blameworthy or guilty. It would, 
he says, be implausible and counterproductive to claim that most ordinary 
citizens of the developed Western countries are blameworthy on account 
of all the existing human misery. It would be moralistic and somewhat silly 
to blame such persons for starvation abroad. As those who collaborated 
with slavery or the subjection of women in the past cannot fairly be blamed 
because they could not reasonably have appreciated the wrongness of their 
conduct, so ordinary citizens cannot fairly be blamed for the contemporary 
misery in the world. Nevertheless, we now think that their conduct was 
wrong, and they ought to have worked toward institutional reforms insofar 
as they were able to do so. Pogge’s theory of moral obligation is unclear 
here. On the one hand, he assumes that it would be “objectively wrong” 
not to do what one can easily do toward the reform of unjust features of 
an institutional scheme for which one shares a collective responsibility. On 
the other hand, he does not wish to “prejudge” the question whether and 
to what extent one is blameworthy for not being aware of this responsibility 
or for being aware but ignoring it. He leaves this question aside because his 
main concern is the moral assessment of social institutions. It is not clear 
why we are not blameworthy for doing what is objectively wrong. However, 
Pogge does suggest that there may be something seriously wrong, morally 
speaking, with the lives we lead.29 
Pogge admits that, because of the great differentiation and complexity 
of the global institutional order, the injustice and our responsibility for it 
are opaque. In assigning causal responsibility for injustices to particular 
institutions, we will often have to rely on complex and speculative empiri-
cal generalizations. We are not like slaveholders who directly impose the 
injustice of slavery upon their slaves. We lead ordinary lives, and nothing 
we do seems to have an adverse impact on the global poor. Consequently 
global inequality and poverty seem to be produced and reproduced without 
the intervention of human agency. The injustices of global inequality and 
poverty are less apparent than those of slavery because they are not intended 
but rather are the outcome of complex processes that take place over long 
distances. Those who participate in the transactions of complex institutions 
cannot be required to anticipate the remote effects of their transactions and 
are therefore not responsible for them.30 Again, Pogge’s theory of responsibil-
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ity is unclear: we are responsible because we collaborate with the unjust 
global order, yet we are not responsible for the remote consequences of our 
transactions in those complex institutions.
IV. THE LARGEST HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION IN HUMAN HISTORY
Pogge claims that world poverty is a harm that we inflict on the world’s 
poor. This claim, he says, seems completely incredible to most citizens of 
the affluent countries. We may consider it “tragic” that the basic human 
rights of so many remain unfulfilled, and we may admit that we should do 
more to help, but it is unthinkable to us that we are actively responsible for 
this catastrophe. If we were, then we would be guilty of “the largest crime 
against humanity ever committed,” the death toll of which exceeds every 
three years that of the Second World War, including the death camps.31 
Pogge says that responsibility for decisions that foreseeably result in 
millions of avoidable deaths rests in the first instance with the politicians 
and negotiators who make them. These politicians and negotiators “have 
knowingly committed some of the largest human rights violations the world 
has ever seen.”32 However, by “helping to impose the present global insti-
tutional order, we are participants in the largest human-rights violation in 
human history.”33 “It is not the gravest human rights violation, because those 
who commit it do not intend the death and suffering they inflict. . . . They 
merely act with willful indifference to the enormous harms they cause.”34
V. THE ARGUMENT fROM NAzISM
Pogge claims that there are as many poverty deaths in the world today every 
seven months as all the killings in the Nazi death camps.35 The global eco-
nomic regime that our countries designed and impose “kills more efficiently 
than the Nazi extermination camps.”36 Pogge says that some will wonder 
how we can possibly be collaborating with the starvation of millions if we 
have never chosen to do any such thing and our lives feel perfectly fine, 
morally. Many Nazi sympathizers wondered likewise. They too never chose 
to support war and genocide, but merely continued to do their jobs; follow-
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ing orders and perhaps attending rallies. Yet, by acting in these ways, they 
did contribute to the massacres. Given what they knew about the ongoing 
war and genocide, and their own causal roles, they ought to have thought, 
chosen, and then acted differently. “And if this is how we think about most 
Germans in the early 1940s, then this is how we must surely think about 
ourselves.”37 
This reference to Germans under Nazi rule is crucial to Pogge’s argument 
about our responsibility for world poverty, so it requires careful analysis. 
First, Pogge refers to “Nazi sympathizers” and “most Germans” as if they 
are synonymous. There is, however, a moral distinction between Nazi 
sympathizers and Germans who were not Nazi sympathizers, but who did 
nothing to resist Nazi policies. Second, Pogge says that Nazi sympathizers, 
by continuing to do their jobs, to follow orders, and perhaps by attending 
rallies “contributed” to the massacres. This may be so in the sense that, if 
they had not done these things, the massacres would not have taken place. 
Nevertheless, the moral culpability of doing one’s job, following orders, and 
attending rallies, even under Nazi rule, is considerably less than direct par-
ticipation in the massacres. Third, Pogge concludes that Nazi sympathizers 
ought to have acted differently because of what they knew about the war 
and genocide and their own causal roles. He does not say what he thinks 
they knew about the war and genocide. It is likely that different Germans 
had different degrees of knowledge about these matters. Fourth, Pogge does 
not say how most Germans ought to have acted differently. This is crucial 
because he relies on how we think about most Germans in the early 1940s 
to determine our obligations for world poverty today. 
Pogge links the Nazis to the way in which the international community 
has addressed the problems of world hunger and poverty in recent years. At 
the World Food Summit in 1996, the 186 participating governments commit-
ted themselves to “achieving food security for all” and to “an on-going effort 
to eradicate hunger in all countries,” with an “immediate view to reducing 
the number of undernourished people to half their present level no later than 
2015.”38 Pogge points out that this declaration envisaged that there would 
be about 250 million deaths from poverty-related causes between 1996 and 
2015. He asks us to imagine President Roosevelt responding, in 1942, to 
concern about Nazi atrocities, and committing the US to halving their cur-
rent level by 1961. Would this have been a morally adequate response?39
But according to Pogge, it gets worse. When formulating the first Mil-
lennium Development Goal (MDG-1) in 2000, the world’s governments 
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changed the language of the pledge, so that now they promised to halve, 
not the number, but the proportion of those living in extreme poverty, thus 
taking advantage of population growth. If the number of those living in 
extreme poverty remains the same, and world population grows, the propor-
tion of the world’s population living in extreme poverty declines even if the 
world’s governments do nothing to reduce poverty. The UN then reinterpreted 
MDG-1 to refer, not to the proportion that the world’s extremely poor con-
stituted of the world’s total population, but, rather, to the proportion that the 
world’s extremely poor constituted of the population of the less developed 
countries, a population group that is growing faster than the world’s total 
population. In a third interpretive move, the UN backdated the baseline 
to 1990, thereby taking advantage both of the population growth between 
1990 and 2000 and of the reduction of 160 million extremely poor in China 
reported for that decade. Pogge calculates that these reinterpretations of the 
United Nations poverty-reduction goals add 361 million human beings to 
the number whose extreme poverty is deemed morally acceptable.40 This 
amounts to about six million additional premature deaths every year from 
poverty-related causes.41 
Pogge tells us that this reminds him of the Wannsee Conference of 
1942, where senior Nazi officials planned the deaths of millions as part of 
their “final solution.” Of course, he says, there is an important difference. 
The German political elite of 1942 intended to engage in the mass murder 
of the Jews and other people they deemed inferior. The global elite of 2000 
harbor no ill will toward the world’s poor; they merely do not care. This 
is a moral difference on the part of the agents, but it does not reduce the 
suffering and deaths of the victims.42 
Pogge’s claim—that the point of his comparison between the Nazis and 
our alleged collaboration with world hunger is not to liken our conduct to 
that of Nazi sympathizers—is not plausible. Contrary to what he claims, Pogge 
does liken us to Nazi sympathizers. He says that, faced with the charge that 
we participate in the deaths of millions of our fellow human beings every 
year, we will wonder how we can possibly be collaborating in these deaths, 
as we have not chosen to do so, and we feel perfectly fine, morally. He im-
mediately goes on to say: “Many Nazi sympathizers wondered likewise.” It 
is true that he distinguishes world poverty as a human rights violation from 
Nazi violations on the ground that we do not intend the deaths. However, 
if we shift our attention from the direct perpetrators of these human rights 
violations to “the sympathizers,” Pogge thinks that we are morally worse 
than the Nazi sympathizers, because we are much more affluent than those 
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Germans were; we have much better sources of information as well as much 
better means of communication and of political organization; and we enjoy 
much more freedom to inform ourselves and to act politically because we 
are much better protected through a set of civil rights that are enforced 
by an independent judiciary.43 This overlooks the fact that we do more for 
the global poor than Nazi sympathizers did to resist the Nazi elite. Pogge 
believes that we do not do enough, but he concedes that we agree with 
him on this. Thus, his argument that we have seriously failed to fulfill our 
obligations towards the global poor depends on his claim that it is feasible 
for us to do much more. 
VI. IS WORLd POVERTY AVOIdAbLE?
Pogge says that the United Nations reinterpretation of its world-poverty 
reduction targets adds 361 million human beings to the number of those 
whose extreme poverty in 2015 “is deemed morally acceptable.” Arguably, 
no government thinks this is morally acceptable; rightly or wrongly, they 
think that this is the best outcome that is feasible. The dispute between Pogge 
and the global elite is not about what is morally acceptable but about what 
is feasible. However, the concept of feasibility raises a number of complex 
conceptual and empirical problems.44
Pogge argues that we are responsible for millions of poverty-related 
deaths each year because these are avoidable. When he says they are avoid-
able, he seems to mean that the financial cost of avoiding them would be 
modest: he calculates it at no more than one percent of the global product. 
Sometimes he suggests that this cost could be met by a small redistribution 
of global wealth. He claims that shifting one-seventieth of the consumption 
expenditure from the 1 billion people in the high-income countries would 
provide the $300 billion in annual consumption the 2.5 billion poor need 
to escape severe poverty. A one percent reduction in the standard of liv-
ing of the global well-off could eradicate severe poverty worldwide. Pogge 
also indicates that he believes the solution to global poverty to be a simple 
redistribution of global wealth by suggesting that the extent of inequality in 
the world is a rough measure of the avoidability of poverty. The inequality 
between the consumption expenditure of the global rich and the global 
poor shows us how cheaply severe poverty could be avoided: covering the 
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collective shortfall from the extreme-poverty line would reduce our share 
from 78.98 percent of the global product to 78.90 percent.45
At other times, Pogge emphasizes not redistribution but simply the low 
cost of eradicating poverty: for example, he says that one-third of all hu-
man deaths are due to poverty-related causes, such as starvation, diarrhea, 
pneumonia, tuberculosis, malaria, measles, and perinatal conditions, all 
of which could be prevented or cured cheaply through food, safe drinking 
water, vaccinations, rehydration packs, or medicines. According to Pogge, 
some 300 million people, mostly children, died avoidably from starvation and 
preventable diseases in less than two decades after the end of the Cold War.46 
However, Pogge admits that, although less than one percent of the gross 
national incomes of the rich countries would suffice to eradicate severe pov-
erty worldwide, it is not presently feasible to transfer this amount to help the 
world’s poorest people because of corrupt government in the poor countries. 
The corruption of government in poor countries can be partly explained by 
the history, culture, and/or natural environment of these countries. However, 
the global economic order also plays a substantial role by influencing how a 
poor country’s history, culture, and natural environment affect the develop-
ment of its domestic institutional order, ruling elite, economic growth, and 
income distribution. The moral debate on global poverty largely concerns 
the extent to which affluent societies and persons have obligations to help 
the global poor. Some deny that there are such obligations; others claim that 
they are quite demanding. Both sides take for granted that we are morally 
related to the global poor as potential helpers. Pogge does not reject this 
assumption, but he holds that we are also, and more significantly, related to 
the global poor as supporters of, and beneficiaries from, a global institutional 
order that substantially contributes to their plight. Here, Pogge again con-
nects the institutional causation of poverty with the individual obligations 
of the well-off. He says that one can continue to contribute to the economy 
of an unjust society and yet avoid collaborating in the undue harming of 
others by taking compensating action: by making as much effort, aimed at 
protecting the victims of injustice or at institutional reform as would suffice 
to eradicate the harms if others followed suit. This conception of the obliga-
tion to do one’s fair share to remedy injustice has been criticized on at least 
two grounds: 1) it may leave victims of injustice with less than their fair 
share; and 2) one may have an obligation to do more than one’s fair share if 
one can rescue a person or persons from severe deprivation or danger at a 
trivial cost.47 Pogge cites Oskar Schindler, the famous rescuer of Jews in the 
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Second World War, as a role-model, but it is doubtful whether it is feasible 
to replicate his exceptional character and circumstances.48
So Pogge emphasizes the need for institutional reform rather than re-
distribution, although he holds that institutional reform would have some, 
minor redistributive consequences. He says that the moral quality of an 
institutional order under which avoidable starvation occurs depends on 
whether and how that order is causally related to this starvation, that is, on 
the extent to which starvation could be avoided through institutional modi-
fication. Pogge believes that many types of reform might solve the problem 
of world poverty at small financial cost. The failure to initiate such reforms 
can be explained by several factors: some reform proposals have been 
unrealistic; even if reform proposals are realistic, it is hard to coordinate 
effort on a common reform strategy; the powerful interests opposing such 
reforms have generally been much more successful at coordinating than the 
reformers. Pogge thinks it is nevertheless possible to reform the rules of the 
global order and eradicate world poverty. Therefore, the privileged citizens 
of the affluent countries have an obligation to support structural reforms of 
the World Trade Organization, the privileges of exploitative dictators under 
international law, and of the global health system to reduce global poverty.49 
Philosophers generally agree that one cannot have an obligation to do 
what is impossible, and therefore any obligation to reduce human rights 
violations in general, and world poverty in particular, implies the ability 
to do so. In saying that poverty-related deaths are avoidable, Pogge means 
that we know how to eliminate the proximate causes of these deaths by 
providing food, safe drinking water, medicines etc., and that it would be 
cheap to do so. However, he admits that the causal pathways from global 
institutions to poverty reduction are complex.50 This admission calls into 
question the nature and stringency of our obligation because we may not 
be able to understand these causal pathways sufficiently well to effectuate 
the necessary poverty reduction. 
Is global poverty avoidable? Pogge argues that moral convictions can 
have real effects in international politics. These may be the moral convic-
tions of political elites, but more commonly politics is influenced by the 
moral convictions of citizens. A dramatic example of this is the abolitionist 
movement which, in the nineteenth century, pressured the British govern-
ment into suppressing the slave trade. A similar moral mobilization may be 
possible for the eradication of world poverty.51 
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VII. THE ANTI-SLAVERY cAMPAIGN
In order to show that we can act effectively to eradicate world poverty, 
Pogge refers to the precedent of the people of Manchester who, in 1787, 
joined the battle against slavery with a petition signed by 11,000 citizens. 
In doing so, they disregarded their own economic interests as an abun-
dance of cotton from slave-labor plantations was processed in Manchester. 
These ordinary people did not blame slavery exclusively on African or Brit-
ish slave traders, or on British politicians. They did not ponder the degree 
of their country’s complicity, or their own share of responsibility, or how 
much could reasonably be expected of people like themselves. They did 
not plead poverty, powerlessness, or ignorance, nor were they deterred by 
the poor prospects of success. These ordinary people of eighteenth-century 
Manchester understood their responsibility for the misery inflicted on distant 
foreigners better than today’s political philosophers. If they could recognize 
and stop their country’s crime, then so can the ordinary citizens of the rich 
democracies today.52
Pogge says that he does not profess to know what citizens in Manches-
ter thought and felt in 1787, but he still makes some strong claims about 
what they thought and felt. He claims, in particular, that what he does 
know about them suggests that they saw their mobilization not as an oner-
ous task regrettably required by religious or moral duty but as a necessary 
component of a life worth living and as an urgent service to their country.53 
However, as we shall see, historians of the British anti-slavery movement 
have concluded that religious and moral duty was probably a significant 
part of their motivation.54 
In any case Pogge cites them as the inspiration for the citizens of the 
affluent countries today. The magnitude of the problem of world poverty, and 
the power and complexity of the institutions that support it may make the 
problem seem insoluble. However, an intelligent effort by a relative small 
number of people could trigger its defeat just as the Manchester mobiliza-
tion of 1787 triggered the defeat of slavery.55
What part did the Manchester anti-slavery petition of 1787 play in the 
abolition of the slave trade and slavery by the British government? What 
relevance, if any, does it have for our obligations to contribute to the eradi-
cation of world poverty today? 
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The British campaign against slavery and the slave trade was initiated in 
1783 by a group of Quakers.56 In 1787 the Society for Effecting the Aboli-
tion of the Slave Trade was established. In the same year the indefatigable 
anti-slavery campaigner and renowned orator, Thomas Clarkson, delivered 
a sermon against slavery at the Collegiate Church in Manchester (later Man-
chester Cathedral).57 When Clarkson arrived in Manchester, he found that an 
abolitionist committee had already been formed there, and that it intended 
to submit a mass petition to Parliament. Manchester probably had a larger 
stake in the slave trade than any other inland city in Britain. Manchester’s 
petition for the abolition of slavery bore 10,600 signatures, about two-thirds 
of eligible, adult males.58 The 1787 Manchester anti-slavery petition was the 
product of Clarkson’s inspiring sermon and a pre-existing intention to submit 
such a petition to Parliament.
In 1788 petitions to Parliament for the abolition of slavery outnumbered 
those on all other subjects combined.59 In 1791 400,000 people petitioned 
Parliament against slavery, probably the largest number of petitions to Par-
liament on one subject at one time.60 There was support for the anti-slavery 
movement in several British cities despite the belief that abolition would 
incur a significant economic cost.61 In 1792 more people signed anti-slavery 
petitions to Parliament than were entitled to vote, and more than signed all 
petitions to Parliament between 1765 and 1784, the period of the Ameri-
can Revolution. On 25 March 1807, Parliament abolished the British slave 
trade. On 1 August 1838 slavery was abolished in the British Empire.62 The 
Manchester petition of 1787 was, therefore, only one moment in a long 
campaign, although Pogge is correct to say that it was a successful campaign 
by ordinary citizens in the face of powerful opposition. 
It has been estimated that the abolition of the slave trade cost the Brit-
ish people 1.8 percent of its annual income over more than fifty years.63 In 
1833 it was agreed to pay £20 million to the planters when the national 
debt was 225 percent of gross national product, which was equivalent to a 
four percent tax rise for ten years. According to Chaim Kaufman and Robert 
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Pape, almost all parts of British society suffered economic losses from the 
anti-slavery campaign, including the urban middle-class Protestant Dissenters 
who formed its core.64 The slave trade generated huge profits to the British 
economy, considerable taxes to the government, and tens of thousands of 
jobs.65 The suppression of the slave trade has been estimated to have cost 
about 5,000 British lives.66 In 1787 the abolition of the slave trade would 
have been thought utopian by almost everyone, especially because of its 
economic value to Britain.67 Many felt that slavery was wrong but that noth-
ing could be done about it.68 
The British anti-slavery campaign may have been the most expensive 
international policy based on moral action in modern history. Kaufman and 
Pape argue that costly international moral action is extremely rare, and is 
likely to take place when it is part of a program of domestic moral reform. 
They maintain that the British anti-slavery movement was motivated by the 
desire for domestic religious and moral reform rather than by cosmopolitan 
values. Protestant Dissenters believed that British society, especially its rul-
ing class, was radically corrupt, and that slavery was only one component, 
though an egregious component, of this corruption. For these anti-slavery 
campaigners, the nation’s moral survival was more important than any mere 
material loss.69 
This plausible interpretation somewhat contradicts Pogge’s speculation 
that the Manchester petitioners were not motivated by religious or moral 
duty, but by a sense of a life worth living and service to their country. How-
ever, the two interpretations may be reconcilable. There is some evidence 
against Kaufman and Pape’s thesis that the anti-slavery movement in Britain 
was not motivated by cosmopolitan values. In 1789, metalworkers from 
Sheffield petitioned Parliament against the slave trade despite the fact that 
the cutlery they made was exported to Africa to pay for slaves. The petition 
stated that the petitioners “considered the case of the nations of Africa as 
their own.”70 The inference to be drawn from the interpretation by Kaufman 
and Pape of the anti-slavery movement’s motivation for Pogge’s recommen-
dations for the anti-poverty movement is that such a movement is likely to 
be successful only if it is part of a strong movement of domestic religious 
and moral reform. There is some, though not decisive, evidence from the 
British anti-slavery campaign that cosmopolitan, humanitarian motives can 
drive a successful movement for international reform against the opposition 
of powerful economic and political interests.
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VIII. THEORY ANd PRAcTIcE
Pogge argues that our responsibility to act against world poverty does not 
depend on whether a fully just global order is realistically attainable. Rawls’s 
theory of justice can be used to design a blueprint of ideal institutions that 
would be perfectly just, but much more important for now is its role in the 
comparative assessment of alternative, feasible institutional schemes. Perhaps 
we will never achieve a global order in which the condition of the worst-off 
is the best it could be, but we do not need the assurance that such an order 
is feasible to recognize that we ought to support institutional reforms that 
improve the condition of the worst-off.71 
Pogge acknowledges that states have an important role to play in the 
eradication of world poverty, but argues that the reform of the ground rules 
regulating international relations is necessary. It is a moral error to take the 
global order for granted. It is possible, but unlikely, that there is no feasible 
and morally justifiable way of making a transition toward a more just global 
order. The task of the philosophical theory of justice is to provide criteria 
for the moral evaluation of our global order that allows us to choose among 
the feasible and morally justifiable strategies for institutional reform, thereby 
specifying our moral tasks gradually to improve the justice of this order. Pogge 
admits that we would require a great deal of complex empirical information 
in order to determine which alternative institutional orders, if any, would 
improve global justice.72 This formidable informational challenge is relevant 
to assessing the moral obligations of ordinary citizens.
IX. VARIETIES Of RESPONSIbILITY
Whereas Pogge derives our moral responsibility to reform global institutions 
from their causal role in the production and maintenance of global poverty, 
David Miller distinguishes between causal and moral responsibility. Causal 
responsibility for harm involves no moral responsibility if the cause of the 
harm is not morally wrong. For example, if I, walking down the street and 
taking ordinary care, trip over a raised paving stone, knock over the person 
in front of me, and injure them, I am causally, but not morally responsible, 
because I have done nothing blameworthy. Moral responsibility presupposes 
some form of blameworthiness: for example, intending or foreseeing harm, 
or violating a standard of reasonable care. An agent may be causally but 
not morally responsible for a harmful outcome of their actions if the chain 
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of events connecting their action and the outcome is long and complex, so 
that the agent could not have reasonably foreseen the outcome. We should 
not be held responsible for the remote consequences of our actions over 
which we have no control because the point of responsibility is to guide 
action. An agent is morally responsible for the harmful consequences of their 
actions only if an agent of normal capacities could have avoided them. The 
possible complexity of the causal links between actions and harmful con-
sequences may render uncertain normative judgments as to whether causal 
responsibility does or does not entail moral responsibility.73
These distinctions clarify Pogge’s account of human rights obligations. 
Pogge believes that we have some causal responsibility for world poverty, and 
consequently some moral responsibility. Miller argues that causal responsibil-
ity does not entail moral responsibility if the causation is not blameworthy, 
and/or if the consequences of our action are so remote that we could not 
have reasonably foreseen them and/or had no control over them. Pogge 
holds that the elites of the rich states are blameworthy, and thus morally 
responsible for world poverty, because the harmful consequences of their 
actions are foreseeable. He is more hesitant about the moral responsibility 
of the ordinary citizens of the rich democracies. They cannot easily foresee 
the consequences of their everyday actions for the global poor and they 
have little or no control over them, but they collaborate collectively in the 
causation of global poverty and have the capacity to resist this causation, 
as the 1787 petitioners resisted slavery.
Miller also distinguishes between outcome and remedial responsibil-
ity. Outcome responsibility for world poverty may be shared by the poor 
countries and the global institutional order, whereas remedial responsibility 
may lie with the rich on the ground that they have the capacity to remedy 
poverty. In Miller’s terms, Pogge argues that the global institutional order and 
the rich countries have causal, moral outcome and remedial responsibility 
for global poverty. Miller, by contrast, holds that moral responsibility is not 
necessary to remedial responsibility; if we have caused harm, we may have 
an obligation to compensate those who have suffered the harm, even if our 
actions were not blameworthy. An action may violate the rights of others, 
yet not be blameworthy. If it does, the agent may have an obligation to 
compensate the victim of the rights violation. 
Moral responsibility is backward-looking and does not consider who 
can remedy the problem; those morally responsible may not be able to do 
so. The view that those who are morally responsible are necessarily those 
who have remedial responsibility risks either leaving suffering unremedied 
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or imposing intolerable costs on those held morally responsible. Miller 
suggests that capacity should be given priority over moral responsibility so 
that suffering may be remedied. This raises the problem that, if those with 
the capacity have no moral obligation to remedy the suffering, they will not 
do so, and thus the problem of remedy will remain unsolved. Miller does 
allow that the responsibility of those with the capacity to remedy suffering 
depends on the cost. 
Capacity to remedy may itself have a moral status: some may be blame-
worthy for lacking capacity; others may merit their capacity and it may, 
consequently, be wrong to burden them with remedial responsibility because 
of their capacity. Responsibility must impose reasonable burdens; people are 
not required to be superhuman, but ignorance or negligence should not be 
an excuse. That those with capacity may have remedial responsibility does 
not absolve those who have moral responsibility, who may have an obliga-
tion of compensation if they acquire the appropriate capacity.74
A person may be responsible for the harm caused to another because 
of a connection between them: for example, a parent may be responsible 
for the neglect of their child while others are not. However, Miller believes 
that the capacity to remedy may entail an obligation to remedy even in the 
absence of a special relation between those with the capacity and those in 
need of the remedy.75 
Finally, Miller holds that, in democracies, citizens are implicated in 
collective responsibility even for policies with which they disagree insofar 
as decisions are informed by principles on which there is agreement, and 
they are taken according to procedures that they accept.76 Here, Miller is 
similar to Pogge: if democratic governments are morally responsible for 
such harms as the causation of world poverty through their participation in 
global institutions, then the citizens of those democracies share some moral 
responsibility simply in virtue of being democratic citizens.77
There is causal responsibility; there is moral responsibility; there is re-
sponsibility based on special relations; and there is remedial responsibility. 
There is no algorithm that determines which of these grounds of responsibil-
ity apply in particular cases. There are several possible grounds of remedial 
responsibility: 1) geographical proximity (e.g., regional responsibility); 2) 
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cultural similarity (e.g., Islamic solidarity); 3) historical connection (e.g., 
responsibility of former colonial powers for contemporary problems in 
former colonies); 4) capacity; 5) fair distribution of burdens; and 6) duty of 
rectification based on moral responsibility. When some or all of these possible 
grounds of responsibility have to be weighed against each other, we are left 
with our intuitions as to how this should be done. The reasons for assigning 
responsibility are plural, which explains in part why not enough is done to 
remedy injustice and suffering.78 Another, arguably weightier explanation is 
that none of these grounds of responsibility has, so far, provided sufficient 
motivation to eradicate world poverty.
X. cONcLUSIONS
Onora O’Neill criticized international human rights law for failing to identify 
the “agents of justice,” those who have both the obligation and the capacity 
to implement that law. Jack Donnelly has defended the Universal Declaration 
model that allocates to states the primary obligations for the fulfillment of 
human rights. He concedes that the model is far from perfect in practice. 
O’Neill calls it a “bitter mockery to the poor and needy.”79
Thomas Pogge holds the existing global order causally and morally 
responsible for the violation of the rights of the global poor, but allows that 
states must play a significant role in the reform of this order. He has sought 
to answer O’Neill’s complaint that human rights declarations fail to specify 
the corresponding obligations by proposing that the political elites of the 
rich states have the primary obligations to reform the global order, but that 
citizens of the rich democracies also have obligations because they are 
collectively complicit in the violations of the rights of the global poor. He 
further argues that these obligations do not impose unrealistic burdens on 
democratic citizens, citing the role of ordinary people in the eighteenth-
century British anti-slavery movement. His allocation of such obligations to 
democratic citizens is problematic because he admits that the causal links 
between citizen action and the eradication of world poverty are extremely 
complex and uncertain.
Pogge’s critique of the global order and of our support for it is reinforced 
by his claim that world poverty constitutes the largest human rights violation 
in human history and his comparison of our role in that violation with the 
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collaboration of ordinary Germans with Nazi rule. He allows that there is 
a difference between world poverty and Nazi crimes in that the latter were 
intended and the former are the product of indifference. His argument must 
solve two problems: 1) to identify the reforms to the global order that would 
eradicate world poverty; and 2) to motivate democratic citizens to support 
such reforms.80 Miller argues that there are several plausible grounds of 
obligation to help the poor, and this may be a source of the indifference 
about which Pogge complains. Pablo Gilabert argues that appealing to the 
positive obligation of the rich to help the very poor may be motivationally 
more effective than attributing causal blame to the rich in complex and 
controversial empirical circumstances.81
Pogge is right that the persistence of world poverty is a moral scandal 
and that it constitutes a massive human rights deficit even if it is not a 
violation because it is not intended. O’Neill’s claim that the human rights 
movement fails to identify the agents of justice seems to miss its mark for 
the following reasons: 1) international human rights law rightly places the 
primary obligation on states; 2) this obligation is supplemented by a host 
of nongovernmental organizations whose capacity is, however, limited; and 
3) Pogge is probably right that the global institutional order is blameworthy, 
but experience shows that its reform is an enormous challenge because it is 
supported by powerful interests. The element missing from the reform project 
is adequate motivation for powerful institutions to take the human rights of 
the global poor seriously, and for citizens to take the relevant institutions 
seriously. Pogge directs our attention to institutional reform. The anti-slavery 
movement should inspire us to believe that the eradication of world poverty 
is not utopian. We must harness the motivation of citizens to the reform of 
institutions. This can and should be done. The first step is for us to believe 
that it both can and should be done.
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XI. POSTScRIPT
The report of the International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute 
Task Force on Illicit Financial Flows, Poverty, and Human Rights empha-
sizes the obligations of states, individually, collectively, nationally, through 
international co-operation, and through their participation in international 
institutions, to confront tax abuses associated with poverty and the denial 
of human rights. It emphasizes also the responsibilities of the banking in-
dustry, including the accountants, lawyers, and other professional service 
providers that support that industry. Rich people cannot hide their wealth 
from legitimate tax authorities without the advice of law firms, accountants, 
insurance companies, and private banks.82 
While global poverty is declining according to some authorities and 
some measures, inequality both between and within nations is increasing. 
This increasing inequality is a potential threat to democracy. Concerns have 
been expressed that tax abuses are contributing to this increasing inequality. 
Tax abuses have considerable negative impacts on the enjoyment of human 
rights. They deprive governments of the resources required to fulfill their 
obligations to realize economic, social, and cultural rights, and to create 
and sustain the institutions that protect civil and political rights. Tax abuse 
may not be a human rights violation in itself, but it may foreseeably lead 
to failures by states to fulfil their human rights obligations and the inability 
of citizens to enjoy their human rights. The human rights implications of 
tax abuses can been understood if the billions of dollars that are said to be 
flowing out of developing countries are compared with the comparatively 
small amounts that are required to lift individuals, families, and communities 
out of the most extreme forms of poverty.83
The recently developed UN Guiding Principles on Business and Hu-
man Rights respond to O’Neill’s concern that the human rights movement 
fails to allocate obligations to agents of justice. These principles allocate to 
states the obligation to ensure coherence among corporate law, tax policy 
and human rights. They also allocate to business enterprises the obligation 
to avoid any negative impacts on human rights through their operations 
and business relationships. Contrary to the view of O’Neill and follow-
ing Donnelly, the most common view among human rights observers is 
that states must bear the primary responsibility for ensuring that business 
enterprises operate with due respect for human rights. It may be tempting, 
and not unreasonable, to be skeptical about the motives of both business 
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enterprises and state elites, but it would be mistaken to believe that the 
UN Guiding Principles have had no positive effects on their human rights 
policies.84 Similarly, the UN Human Rights Council’s Guiding Principles on 
Extreme Poverty and Human Rights allocate responsibility for realizing hu-
man rights to states, but emphasize that other actors, including international 
organizations, national human rights institutions, civil society organizations 
and business enterprises also have human rights responsibilities, especially 
regarding the rights of the poor. States, however, have, on this account, the 
primary obligation to create an enabling environment that promotes the 
capacity of individuals, community-based organizations, social movements, 
and other nongovernmental organizations to combat poverty and empower 
the poor to claim their rights.85
